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THIRTY-EIGHT YEARS AND COUNTING: THE FDA’S MISUSE OF 
THE 510(K) NOTIFICATION PROCESS AND CONSEQUENT UNDER-
REGULATION OF IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Failing Hip Replacements 
In 2010, DePuy Orthopaedics, a division of medical device manufacturer 
Johnson & Johnson, voluntarily recalled its ASR XL Acetabular hip 
replacement systems.1 These hip replacements, known as metal-on-metal 
implants—because both the ball and socket components of the artificial hip 
joint were made from metal,2 were shown to exhibit a higher than normal 
failure rate, leading to a greater need for surgical revision among hip 
replacement recipients.3 Because both components of the implant were metal, 
these components often grinded together creating metallic debris that was 
potentially toxic and damaging to an implant recipient’s bones and tissue. This 
metallic debris had been linked to certain cancers.4 These particular hip 
implants had been in use in the United States (U.S.) since 2008 when the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) cleared them for marketing through a 
preliminary regulatory review method known as the 510(k) Premarket 
Notification (PMN) Process.5 
In response to the recall, thousands of lawsuits have been filed against 
DePuy on behalf of plaintiffs alleging to have suffered serious injuries as a 
 
 1. See DePuy ASR Recall Response Supporting Patients and Clinicians, DEPUY 
ORTHOPAEDICS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.playitliveitforlife.com/sites/default/files/DPYUS1% 
20Recall%20Notice.pdf. 
 2. Medical Devices, Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/ 
medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/implantsandprosthetics/metalonmetalhipimplants/
default.htm (last updated Jan. 17, 2013). 
 3. Brent M. Ardaugh et al., The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal Hip Implant, 368 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 98 (2013). 
 4. Barry Meier, Maker Aware of 40% Failure in Hip Implant, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/business/jj-study-suggested-hip-device-could-fail-in-thou 
sands-more.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Deborah Cohen, How Safe are Metal-on-Metal Hip 
Impants?, 344 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 2 (2012). 
 5. Ardaugh et al., supra note 3, at 98; Premarket Notification (510k), FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourde 
vice/premarketsubmissions/premarketnotification510k/default.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2014). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
348 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:347 
result of the hip implant’s failure.6 One of the more troubling aspects of this 
particular device has surfaced in the wake of these pending actions, as reports 
have been discovered indicting that the device manufacturer was actually 
aware that the implants had a higher propensity for failure well before the 
recall was made.7 While many of these cases are still being litigated,8 the 
DePuy hip recall underscores an unconventional means through which medical 
devices may obtain the FDA’s regulatory blessing and raises questions 
regarding the adequacy of the Agency’s ability to protect the public against 
unsafe medical devices. 
In the case of the DePuy hip replacement, the FDA’s grant of marketing 
clearance was based on DePuy’s showing that the ASR device was 
substantially equivalent to components contained in a number of earlier hip 
implants, including grandfathered devices that had been in use before the FDA 
began reviewing new medical devices to ensure their safety and effectiveness.9 
The risks associated with some of the devices to which substantial equivalence 
was shown, however, precluded the continuation of their use long before 
DePuy’s device was ever cleared.10 Considering the method through which the 
DePuy ASR hip implants legally became available for use, it is evident that 
such a process is not an effective means of regulating the safety of similar 
implantable devices intended for use and marketing in the U.S. 
B. Comment Overview 
Congress developed the 510(k) PMN Process as a means of balancing the 
need to ensure the safety of medical devices made available, with that of 
timely access to medical innovation.11 Using 510(k), the safety and 
effectiveness of low- and moderate-risk devices can be evaluated through a 
relatively quick and painless process, so that new or improved devices can 
become accessible to patients sooner. Since implemented, however, this 
process has met its share of critics raising concerns regarding its 
 
 6. Troy Roberts, The FDA’s 510(k) Approval Process in Medical Device Litigation, AM. 
BAR ASS’N (July 29, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/products/articles/ 
summer2013-0713-fda510k-approval-process-medical-device-litigation.html. 
 7. Meier, supra note 4. 
 8. Roberts, supra note 6. 
 9. Ardaugh et al., supra note 3, at 98. 
 10. See Ardaugh et al., supra note 3, at 98 (noting that clearance of the ASR XL device was 
based on devices that were themselves determined to be substantially equivalent to three pre-
amendment metal-on-metal hip implant devices—the McKee-Farrar, Ring, and Sivash—all of 
which “were discontinued long ago (and well before clearance if the ASR XL) because their risk 
of revision was so much higher than that of other hip prostheses.”). 
 11. Diane M. Zuckerman et al., Medical Device Recalls and the FDA Approval Process, 171 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1006, 1006 (2011). 
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effectiveness.12 While the 510(k) Process was created to evaluate the safety of 
devices posing no more than moderate risks, various medical devices had 
already been in use and marketed throughout the U.S. by the time device 
regulations were introduced.13 The presence of these so called pre-amendment 
devices in the American market necessitated an alternative use for the 510(k) 
process. This was intended to be a temporary means of bringing these existing 
devices under the FDA’s regulatory purview.14 Over the course of 510(k)’s 
thirty-eight year history, however, the FDA has lost sight of the temporary 
nature of this secondary use. Instead, the Agency has made a habit out of 
inappropriately using the PMN Process to evaluate the safety of many devices, 
including some with the greatest potential to create dangers to their users—
implantable medical devices. In doing so, the FDA is essentially putting the 
users of these devices at a greater risk of harm. 
The FDA’s continued reliance on this inappropriate use of the 510(k) 
Process is unacceptable and results chiefly from the Agency’s inexcusable 
failure to properly classify and regulate the medical device types that were in 
existence prior to the passage of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA)—
nearly four decades ago. Using the DePuy hip implant and its subsequent recall 
as a starting point of reference,15 Section II describes the current state of the 
premarket review of medical devices. Based on this regulatory framework, 
Section III discusses the major problems that have developed out of the current 
uses of the 510(k) Process. Section IV takes a closer look at the FDA’s 
handling of both implantable devices and those devices marketed prior to the 
enactment of the MDA. It also examines the impact that these pre-amendment 
devices have had on the 510(k) Process and premarket review more broadly. 
Recognizing the safety concerns that have resulted from the FDA’s treatment 
of pre-amendment devices, Section V investigates the justifications available 
for the Agency’s continued use of 510(k) with respect to pre-amendment 
devices over the past four decades. Finding no reasonable justification, Section 
 
 12. Id. at 1009. 
 13. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE 510(K) PROGRAM: EVALUATING SUBSTANTIAL 
EQUIVALENCE IN PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS [510(K)] GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 2-3 n. 5 (2014). 
 14. 515 Program Initiative, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Centers 
Offices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHTransparency/ucm240310.htm (last 
updated June 3, 2014) [hereinafter 515 Program Initiative]. 
 15. The problems identified through the experience of the DePuy hip case are not unique to 
this particular orthopedic device. It is merely illustrative of an ongoing issue concerning 
numerous pre-amendment devices. A study examining medical devices recalled between 2005 
and 2009 indicated that of the 115 recalls, like the DePuy hip implant, thirteen were pre-
amendment devices cleared for marketing through the 510(k) clearance process. Zuckerman et al., 
supra note 11, at 1007, 1008. These recalled devices included several automated external 
defibrillators (AEDs) and intra-aortic balloons that had also been linked to serious injury and 
even death. Id. at 1008. 
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VI considers the most recent efforts made towards bringing 510(k)’s rampant 
misuse to an end, to reach the conclusion that as it is currently situated, the 
FDA lacks the ability to optimally police future advancements in medicine and 
medical technology. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF MEDICAL DEVICE PREMARKET REVIEW 
Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) 
in 1938, which initiated the government’s role in the regulation of medical 
products to ensure the safety and effectiveness of those products marketed in 
the U.S.16 The FD&C Act established a protocol that authorized the FDA to 
begin regulating new drugs by requiring them to undergo a premarket review 
process that included clinical trials evaluating safety and effectiveness.17 
However, because medical devices of that time were relatively simple 
instruments whose defects could be easily detected, the authority the FD&C 
Act granted to the FDA stopped short of regulating medical devices.18 
A. The Medical Device Amendments 
In the decades that followed the FD&C Act’s enactment, advancements in 
research and technology led to the introduction and use of more complex 
devices.19 Many of these advanced devices available on the market and 
ultimately caused very serious injuries and even death among the patients and 
consumers who used them. Included in these devices were intra-uterine 
contraceptives such as the Dalkon Shield, which had been linked to various 
instances of infertility, as well as miscarriages and maternal deaths.20 Reports 
of cases like the Dalkon Shield brought the issue of medical device regulation 
in to the arena of public concern.21 The increased attention resulted in 
Congress passing amendments to the FD&C Act in 1976 known as the MDA, 
which provided a framework in which medical devices would be brought under 
the FDA’s regulatory purview.22 
 
 16. Jordan Bauman, The “Déjà Vu Effect:” Evaluation of United States Medical Device 
Legislation, Regulation, and the Food and Drug Administration’s Contentious 510(k) Program, 
67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 337, 339-40 (2012). 
 17. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 11, at 1006. 
 18. See David R. Challoner & William W. Vodra, Medical Devices and Health – Creating a 
New Regulatory Framework for Moderate Risk Devices, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 977, 977 (2011). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 11, at 1006; see also William H. Maisel, Medical 
Device Regulation: An Introduction for the Practicing Physician, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
296, 296 (2004). 
 21. Zuckerman et al., supra note 11, at 1006. 
 22. See id. 
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1. Medical Device Classification 
The MDA established a system of classification that required the FDA to 
group medical devices into one of three regulatory classes.23 A device’s 
categorization into one of these classes is based on the level of controls needed 
to ensure the safety and effectiveness of that particular device.24 
Class I devices are considered low-risk medical devices.25 Because of the 
minimal risks associated with their use, only general controls (which are 
applicable to all medical devices regardless of their classification) are required 
to provide a reasonable assurance of device safety and effectiveness.26 
Applicable general controls include the general requirements found in the 
provisions of the FD&C Act addressing adulterated, misbranded, banned, and 
restricted devices as well as device registration, reporting, and notification 
requirements.27 Additionally, Class I devices may not be intended for the use 
of supporting or sustaining life or have an important role in preventing 
impairment to human life, and must not present the potential for unreasonable 
risk of injury or illness.28 Class I includes devices such as tongue depressors, 
mechanical (manual) wheelchairs, and carbon dioxide absorbers.29 
Class II contains moderate-risk devices.30 In addition to the general 
controls, special controls are required to provide a reasonable assurance of the 
safety and effectiveness of these devices.31 These additional controls include 
performance standards, post-market surveillance, patient registries, guidelines 
and labeling, and premarket data requirements.32 Devices grouped within Class 
II include powered wheelchairs, hypodermic needles, and peak-flow 
spirometer devices.33 
High-risk devices are classified within Class III and receive the most 
regulatory scrutiny.34 Unlike Class I devices, these devices may be used to 
support or sustain life, may have an important role in preventing impairment to 
 
 23. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (2012). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii)(II); Challoner & Vodra, supra note 18, at 978. 
 26. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A); General Controls for Medical Devices, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/General 
andSpecialControls/ucm055910.htm (last updated June 26, 2014) [hereinafter General Controls]. 
 27. See General Controls, supra note 26. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 21 C.F.R. §§ 868.5310, 880.6230, 890.3850 (2013). 
 30. Challoner & Vodra, supra note 18, at 977. 
 31. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 32. Regulatory Controls, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceReg 
ulationandGuidance/Overview/GeneralandSpecialControls/default.htm (last updated June 26, 
2014). 
 33. 21 C.F.R. §§ 868.1870, 880.5570, 890.3860 (2013). 
 34. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C); Challoner & Vodra, supra note 18, at 978. 
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human life, or might present the potential for unreasonable risk of injury or 
illness.35 And unlike Class II devices, the use of special controls would not be 
sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of the device’s safety and 
effectiveness.36 As a result, the path to legal marketing for these devices 
requires compliance with the general controls and also the premarket approval 
process, the most intensive premarket review process established by Congress, 
described below.37 
2. Premarket Review Mechanisms 
While some devices are exempt from premarket review because of the 
minimal risks associated with their use,38 there are two main processes though 
which the FDA reviews medical devices and either approves or clears them for 
use in the U.S. These two processes are respectively known as the Premarket 
Approval (PMA) Process and the 510(k) PMN (or Premarket Clearance) 
Process, the latter deriving its name from the section of the MDA in which it 
can be found.39 
The MDA requires that Class III devices undergo PMA—a stringent 
premarket review process.40 Under this process, a device manufacturer must 
submit full reports of all information known or reasonably known to the 
manufacturer or sponsor submitting the PMA Application on its behalf, 
regarding: investigations undertaken to assess the safety and effectiveness of 
the device; all the components and properties of the device; the methods, 
facilities and controls used in and for the manufacturing, processing, 
packaging, and installing the device; specimens of labeling proposed for the 
device; and any other information relevant to the application required by the 
FDA.41 Once a device manufacturer submits a PMA Application, the FDA 
must review and approve, or deny the application within 180 days.42 The FDA 
may deny a PMA Application if: the application fails to provide a showing of a 
reasonable assurance of safety or effectiveness; the methods, facilities, or 
controls used in and for manufacturing, processing, packaging, or installation 
of the device are substandard; or proposed labels contain false or misleading 
statements.43 
 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Challoner & Vodra, supra note 18, at 978. 
 39. See INST. OF MED., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) 
CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 1 (2011). 
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a) (2012). 
 41. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1). 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(1). 
 43. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2). 
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A key difference between the two processes is the approval versus 
clearance distinction. Acceptable devices subject to PMA are approved while 
those passing the 510(k) Process are merely cleared for marketing.44 The 
MDA contemplates that only devices in Class I or Class II that are not exempt 
from premarket review will be subject to this abbreviated premarket review 
process.45 The 510(k) Process allows for devices to be cleared for marketing 
with greater ease and in less time than the PMA Process.46 The purpose of this 
abbreviated process is to support innovation in medical device technology by 
making certain that advances in medical technology are available faster.47 FDA 
regulations require that manufacturers of devices subject to the 510(k) Process 
submit a premarket notification to the FDA at least ninety days before they 
plan to commercially distribute a device.48 
The FDA’s regulations also outline the content of this required submission. 
Such a submission must include information detailing the name of the device, 
its classification, and information about the manufacture or the sponsor 
submitting notification on its behalf.49 Additionally, submissions must contain 
“an explanation of how the device functions, the scientific concepts that form 
the basis of the device, and the significant physical and performance 
characteristics of the device,” as well as statements of its intended used and 
substantial equivalence to devices currently marketed.50 Manufacturers must 
also provide statements detailing the similarities and/or differences between 
their device and the predicate device or devices to which it claims substantial 
equivalence, and provide an explanation as to how any changes could create a 
significant impact on the safety or effectiveness of the new device.51 
B. Post-Medical Device Amendments: Legislative Changes to Premarket 
Review 
While the MDA provided a solid framework on which medical device 
regulation could be based, in some ways the regulatory scheme contemplated 
in the initial amendments was not entirely compatible with the realities facing 
both the FDA and medical devices. Thus, since its enactment, Congress has 
passed three major pieces of legislation aimed at modifying and strengthening 
the MDA, in order to increase the ease and effectiveness of premarket review 
 
 44. Challoner & Vodra, supra note 18, at 978. 
 45. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012). 
 46. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-04-10-00480, 
FDA’S CLEARANCE OF MEDICAL DEVICES THROUGH THE 510(K) PROCESS 1 (2013) [hereinafter 
OIG 2013 REPORT]. 
 47. Zuckerman et al., supra note 11, at 1009. 
 48. 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a) (2014). 
 49. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92 (2014). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 21 C.F.R. § 807.87. 
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processes for medical devices. These legislative effects are: the Safe Medical 
Devices Act (SMDA), the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 
(FDAMA), and the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act 
(FDASIA).52 
The first step Congress took to improve device review was the SMDA in 
1990.53 The SMDA broadened the applicability of the substantial equivalence 
standard,54 expanded the definition of Class II devices allowing an increased 
number of previously unclassified devices to fit within the category,55and 
required the FDA to establish a schedule for the promulgation of regulations 
requiring PMA Applications for Class III devices that were not previously 
required to submit such applications.56 The next major change to the MDA 
came in 1997, when Congress passed the FDAMA. The FDAMA altered the 
medical device review process by, among other things, exempting 
investigational devices as well as some Class I and Class II devices from 
certain review requirements.57 It also introduced an alternative review process 
for low-risk devices, narrowed the scope of the FDA’s review of 510(k) 
devices,58 and mandated that devices be reviewed within timeframes 
established for both the 510(k) and PMA Processes.59 Most recently, Congress 
passed the FDASIA in 2012, which further modified many of the changes 
brought about by previous legislative revisions and introduced a regulatory 
change to device classification that authorized the FDA to classify or re-
classify certain devices by administrative orders, rather than promulgating 
regulations.60 
 
 52. While Congress enacted several other pieces of legislation that significantly impacted 
medical devices and their regulation — namely, the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization 
Act of 2002, Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, and the FDASIA — the 
SMDA, FDAMA and FDASIA have affected the most significant changes in the regulatory 
process originally contemplated in the MDA. Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Substantial Equivalence 
Premarket Review: The Right Approach for Most Medical Devices, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 364, 
367, 370, 386 (2014). 
 53. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 249. 
 54. Safe Medical Device Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 4(a), 104 Stat. 4511, 4515 
(1990). 
 55. Safe Medical Device Act § 4(b). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §§ 201, 
206, 111 Stat. 2296, 2333-34, 2339 (1997). 
 58. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act § 202. 
 59. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act § 209. 
 60. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.112-144, 
§ 608, 126 Stat. 993, 1055-59 (2012). 
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III.  MAJOR CONCERNS IMPACTING 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AS IT EXISTS 
TODAY 
A great deal of attention has focused on the inadequacies of the FDA’s 
medical device premarket review methods.61 Because 510(k) or the PMN 
Process is used to review significantly more devices than the PMA Process, the 
510(k) Process is subjected to sharp criticism. Much of the attention and 
criticism stems from concerns that the process fails to ensure that only safe 
devices are made available to patients.62 Thus, various investigations have 
been launched to identify the source of the breakdown in this regulatory 
process.63 To that end, recognizing that problems exist within the PMN 
Process, the FDA commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to investigate 
whether 510(k) “protect[s] patients optimally and promote[s] innovation in 
support of public health” and to determine what changes would be necessary in 
the event that it does not.64 The IOM’s report and other 510(k) investigations 
have identified a number of crucial failures that undermine the clearance 
process’ ability to protect the public from dangerous devices.65 Generally, 
these failures can be categorized as relating to either the substantial 
equivalence standard itself or the standard’s reliance on predicate devices. 
A. Substantially Equivalent, But Not Safe and Effective 
In what is arguably the most damning critique of the 510(k) Process, the 
sufficiency of the standard against which this process evaluates medical 
devices is often called into question. The standard set forth in the MDA that all 
devices, regardless of their classification, are measured against to evaluate 
their fitness for marketing, requires that device manufacturers only 
 
 61. For example, see INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 4 (providing an FDA commissioned 
review of the 510(k) clearance process to determine whether “the process optimally protect[s] 
patients and promote[s] innovation in support of public health”); see also Jonas Zajac Hines et al., 
Left to Their Own Devices: Breakdowns in United States Medical Device Premarket Review, 
PLOS MED., July 2010, at 1, 1, available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi% 
2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000280 (reviewing “eight addressable weaknesses at the FDA level 
and above that impeded the agency’s ability to review devices for efficacy”); see also Zuckerman 
et al., supra note 11, at 1006 (analyzing recalled devices initially cleared through 510(k)); see 
also Challoner & Vodra, supra note 18, at 979 (advocating for the replacement of the 510(k) 
process with a new regulatory framework); see also OIG 2013 REPORT, supra note 46, at 13, 15 
(noting the FDA’s continued reliance on 510(k) to clear pre-amendment devices). 
 62. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 4. 
 63. Id. at 34; Hines et al., supra note 61, at 4; CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL 
HEALTH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) WORKING GROUP PRELIMINARY REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 16 (2010) (all discussing the 510(k) notification process and failures with 
premarket medical device review). 
 64. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 4. 
 65. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 191; Hines et al., supra note 61, at 1. 
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demonstrate a “reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness.”66 In the case 
of the 510(k) Process, this reasonable assurance is satisfied if a manufacturer 
shows that its device is substantially equivalent to any device previously 
cleared through the 510(k) Process.67 Thus, the standard can be met so long as 
a device maker shows that the device it seeks to market is similar to a device 
currently marketed. The standard relies on the assumption that the new device 
is at least as safe and effective as the predicate device on which its clearance is 
based.68 Therefore, this standard encourages manufacturers to focus on proving 
that their new devices are similar enough to an old device, rather than making 
an effort to show that the new device in and of itself, is actually safe or 
effective.69 
Additionally, in 1990, the SMDA allowed for device manufacturers to 
make a showing of substantial equivalence even when differences in the 
technological characteristics exist between the new device and predicate device 
to which it seeks to claim equivalence.70 Under the SMDA, only new issues of 
safety or effectiveness will bar a finding of substantial equivalence.71 
Implicitly, this allows device manufacturers to secure clearance for new 
devices by relying on predicate devices that are significantly different from the 
new devices claiming to be equivalent.72 
Further, the standard established by the MDA for reviewing medical 
devices is a lower standard than that which has been in place for reviewing 
new drugs.73 While medical devices manufacturers need only demonstrate a 
“reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness,”74 premarket approval of 
new drugs requires that drug makers show “substantial evidence” of safety and 
effectiveness.75 New drug applications generally consist of at least two clinical 
studies evaluating a new drug, while PMA Applications for medical devices 
generally have just one and clinical data is seldom included in 510(k) 
submissions.76 The difference in approval standards results in a higher level of 
scrutiny afforded to the review of new drugs than new devices. In an age where 
the simplistic nature of medical devices presented minimal risks in use, 
perhaps this deferential standard may have been more appropriate. However, 
because devices have experienced dramatic advancements in both technology 
 
 66. 21 U.S.C. § 360(m) (2012). 
 67. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1) (2012). 
 68. INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 88. 
 69. See id. at 88-89. 
 70. Hines et al., supra note 61, at 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 3-4. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5) (2012). 
 76. Hines et al., supra note 61, at 3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THIRTY-EIGHT YEARS AND COUNTING 357 
and use—as seen through implantable devices such as the DePuy hip and the 
grave risks that have been associated with its use—the weakness of the device 
review standard is apparent. 
B. Predicate Reliance on Pre-Amendment Devices 
The clearance of a new device through the 510(k) Process can be based on 
a device manufacturer establishing that its device is substantially equivalent to 
any device already legally marketed.77 Therefore, a new device can be shown 
as substantially equivalent to one predicate device that was itself shown as 
substantially equivalent to an earlier device.78 As this cycle continues, the 
potential for major differences to arise between new devices and the predicates 
on which their clearance is based, increases.79 Additionally, reliance on any 
predicate device also undermines the integrity of the 510(k) Process’ assurance 
of safety and effectiveness because devices legally marketed prior to the 
enactment of the MDA often times serve as predicate devices. Since such pre-
amendment devices were not evaluated for safety and effectiveness, there is a 
similar void of assurance in the safety of the new devices claiming substantial 
equivalence.80 
Similarly, even if after completing the 510(k) Process, the FDA determines 
that a device cannot show substantial equivalent to a predicate device, some 
devices may still be cleared for marketing through a review procedure created 
by the FDAMA.81 This provision creates a path to legal marketing for novel 
low-risk devices without having to undergo the PMA Process.82 Since such 
new devices are denied clearance through 510(k) because they are not shown 
as equivalent to any other marketed device, it is unclear what assurances of 
safety and effectiveness serve as the basis for clearing them for marketing. 
These issues highlight reasons why the 510(k) Process leaves room for 
concern about how effectively the FDA controls the safety of the devices 
actually intended to be regulated through this process—those posing low and 
moderate risks.83 However, because there were devices in existence and use 
prior to the enactment of the MDA, some devices belonging in Class III have 
been and continue to be reviewed and cleared for marketing through 510(k) 
based on a showing of their substantial equivalence to a pre-amendment device 
that was never properly classified.84 These identified 510(k) issues—when 
 
 77. See 21 U.S.C. §360c(c), (f). 
 78. Hines et al., supra note 61, at 4. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 36. 
 81. Hines et al., supra note 61, at 4. 
 82. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2). 
 83. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(B). 
 84. INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 100. 
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considered in light of the fact that the FDA has also been using this broken 
regulatory mechanism to control the availability of medical devices whose 
high risks actually require the highest level of premarket review afforded to 
medical devices—makes this long-standing FDA practice particularly 
alarming. 
IV.  PRE-AMENDMENT IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES 
When Congress passed the MDA in 1976, two issues threatened the 
smooth transition into this new medical device regulatory framework. First, the 
use and marketing of certain medical devices was already prevalent in the U.S. 
These devices—known as pre-amendment devices—had been freely bought, 
sold, and used in interstate commerce without any legal consequence well 
before the MDA was enacted.85 Second, included among these exiting pre-
amendment devices were implantable devices. FDA regulations now define 
implantable devices as medical devices that are “placed into a surgically or 
naturally formed cavity of the human body.”86 Because the use of these devices 
requires what essentially amounts to the implantation of a foreign substance 
into the human body for a prolonged time period, they often carry the potential 
to present unique health risks among patients who receive them. 
Given these risks, the FDA generally classifies these implantable devices 
alongside Class III devices intended to support or sustain life, and subjects 
them to the greatest deal of regulatory scrutiny afforded to medical devices—
PMA.87 The existence of these pre-amendment devices, particularly those 
implantable in nature, added an additional dimension to Congress’s efforts to 
regulate the medical devices that could become commercially available. They 
forced Congress to find an equitable balance between the existing pre-
amendment devices and the new devices introduced after the MDA’s 
enactment, in order to prevent the arbitrary treatment of similar devices 
differing only in their date of introduction to the market.88 
As a general rule, the MDA classifies all pre-amendment devices into 
Class III.89 This Class III assignment, however, was merely a classification in 
 
 85. Id. at 68. 
 86. 21 C.F.R. § 812.3(d) (2014). 
 87. 21 C.F.R. § 860.93 (2014). 
 88. See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG CASES AND MATERIALS 1215 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
 89. Section 513 of the Medical Device Amendments sets out the limited circumstances in 
which a pre-amendment device could be down-classified into Class I or II and provides that: 
Any device intended for human use which was not introduced or delivered for 
introduction into interstate commerce for commercial distribution before May 28, 1976, is 
classified in class III unless– (A) the device– (i) is within a type of device (I) which was 
introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce for commercial 
distribution before such date and which is to be classified pursuant to subsection (b) of 
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name. Unlike most other Class III devices, there was no determination of the 
level of controls necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of these pre-
amendment devices prior to their statutory assignment into this category.90 
Thus, although these devices had been effectively classified, the risks 
associated with their use remained undefined and the categorization did little to 
address or promote device safety. 
To the extent that a Class III device requires the most stringent level of 
review before receiving approval for marketing, the MDA’s approach to these 
devices is not problematic; provided, of course, that this stringent review is 
actually utilized. However, these devices were already marketed and available 
and PMAs were not immediately required for the existing devices or new 
devices falling within their device types.91 Instead, in order to protect the 
availability of devices already marketed and in use, Congress effectively 
grandfathered the pre-amendment devices.92 Doing so allowed the continued 
use of these pre-amendment devices and through the 510(k) process, permitted 
clearance for marketing new devices claiming to be their substantial 
equivalent, despite the fact that these Class III devices required, but never 
received, stringent review.93 
To be fair, Congress did not give the FDA carte blanche to completely 
disregard the regulatory framework the MDA created with respect to pre-
amendment devices. The MDA mandates that the FDA ultimately review all 
the pre-amendment Class III devices to determine whether the PMA Process is 
appropriate, or whether devices need to be reclassified and subjected to other 
premarket review methods.94 The use of the 510(k) in this respect was merely a 
preventative measure Congress implemented to avoid the disparate treatment 
of similar devices introduced before and after MDA enactment.95 The 510(k) 
Process was only intended to be used until the FDA issued a final regulation or 
order requiring that a PMA Application be submitted for a particular pre-
 
this section, or (II) which was not so introduced or delivered before such date and has 
been classified in class I or II, and (ii) is substantially equivalent to another device within 
such type, or (B) the Secretary in response to a petition submitted under paragraph (3) has 
classified such device in class I or II. 
21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1) (2012). 
 90. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 219. 
 91. As discussed below, PMAs would only be required for pre-amendment devices if upon 
review, the FDA determined these devices properly belonged in Class III. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) 
(2012). However, the FDA’s review of these devices would only occur if it is determined that a 
pre-amendment device was never classified, or if the FDA determines—on its own, or by a 
manufacturer’s petition—that a particular device warrants reclassification. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2), 
(3). 
 92. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 100. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b). 
 95. See BARTON HUTT ET AL., supra note 88, at 1215. 
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amendment device.96 Thus, device manufacturers could continue marketing 
these and similar new devices provided they demonstrate that the new devices 
are substantially equivalent to an unclassified pre-amendment device in 
accordance with the 510(k) Process.97 
That notwithstanding, Congress contemplated that once the FDA had 
reviewed all the Class III pre-amendment devices and determined which 
among them should be reclassified as Class I or Class II devices and which 
should remain classified as Class III devices, such Class III devices would be 
subject to the standard PMA Process: 
In the case of a class III device which—(A) was introduced or delivered for 
introduction into interstate commerce for commercial distribution before May 
28, 1976; or (B) is (i) of a type so introduced or delivered and (ii) is 
substantially equivalent to another device within that type, the Secretary shall 
by administrative order . . . require that such device have an approval under 
this section of an application for premarket approval.98 
It is, therefore, apparent that the use of the 510(k) Process with respect to 
pre-amendment Class III devices was intended to be a temporary, transitional 
tool used only to help equitably facilitate the implementation of the new 
regulatory system.99 
In 1976, when the MDA was enacted, there were more than 170 Class III 
pre-amendment device types awaiting review and temporarily subjected to the 
510(k) Process.100 As of this writing, nearly thirty-eight years later, at least 
fourteen pre-amendment devices are still waiting to be reviewed and properly 
classified.101 Notable among the types of pre-amendment devices not yet 
reclassified is a femoral hip prosthesis.102 This is the device type that served as 
the basis for the 510(k) submission that ultimately led to marketing clearance 
for the DePuy ASR hip replacement that was recalled in 2010.103 In a 
 
 96. General and Plastic Surgery Devices; Reclassification of the Topical Oxygen Chamber 
for Extremities, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,390, 17,391 (April 6, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 878). 
 97. See id. 
 98. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1). 
 99. Id.; see also General and Plastic Surgery Devices: Reclassification of the Topical 
Oxygen Chamber for Extremities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 17,391. 
 100. 515 Program Initiative, supra note 14. 
 101. Id. While the exact number of unclassified/reviewed devices to date was not specifically 
reported, the FDA reports that there were twenty-six device types in 2009. Id. Counting from a 
FDA spreadsheet, fourteen still require action in February 2014. 515 Project Status, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTo 
bacco/CDRH/CDRHTransparency/ucm240318.htm (last updated Feb 24, 2014) [hereinafter 515 
Project Status 2014]. See also infra note 156. 
 102. 21 C.F.R. § 888.333 (2014). 
 103. See Class 2 Device Recall Depuy ASR XL Acetabular Cup System, FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?id=96136 (last 
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timeframe spanning nearly forty years, the U.S. government, through the FDA, 
has not been able to completely and effectively review and classify roughly 
170 types of medical devices in order to accurately assess the level of review 
necessary to ensure that only safe devices are approved for use in this country. 
This troubling reality raises serious questions regarding the ability and 
efficiency of one of the most crucial government Agencies entrusted with the 
responsibility of protecting and promoting public health.104 
V.  FDA’S FAILURE TO REVIEW AND CLASSIFY 
Because medical devices were widely marketed before the MDA became 
effective, the FDA was forced to temporarily use a premarket review process, 
510(k)—designed to facilitate a showing of a reasonable assurance of safety 
and effectiveness among devices presenting no more than moderate risks—to 
evaluate pre-amendment devices whose perceived risks exceeded the moderate 
risk threshold the 510(k) Process was intended to evaluate. One would assume 
that the FDA would have acted with haste to address these unclassified devices 
in order to keep this improper use of the 510(k) Process to an absolute 
minimum. This, however, has not been the case. 
Instead, the FDA has taken every bit of its time to review and classify the 
pre-amendment devices, taking full advantage of the relative ease of 510(k) 
regulatory requirements and in the process, allowing 510(k) to become the 
primary mechanism used to evaluate Class III pre-amendment devices.105 No 
pre-amendment Class III devices were required to undergo the PMA Process 
until 1984, when the first regulation mandating PMA for a pre-amendment 
device was published, a full eight years after the MDA was enacted.106 While 
various influences both within and beyond the FDA’s control may have 
impacted the speed of review, a number of factors contributing to the FDA’s 
failure to complete its review of the pre-amendment Class III devices suggest 
that the problem is rooted in larger, underlying Agency-wide issues. 
A. Burdensome Procedural Classification Process 
Perhaps one reason for the FDA’s apparent foot-dragging with regard to its 
review and classification of these pre-amendment devices was the burdensome 
 
updated Jan. 16, 2014) (summarizing the DePuy ASR XL 510(k) application and recall); see also 
Ardaugh et al, supra note 3, at 98. 
 104. See BARTON HUTT ET AL., supra note 88, at 5. 
 105. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 81; see also Amanda Swanson, 510(k) Clearance: 
Opportunities to Incentivize Medical Device Safety Through Comparative Effectiveness Research, 
10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 117, 126-127 (2013). 
 106. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/PEMID-88-14, MEDICAL DEVICES: 
FDA’S 510(K) OPERATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED 38 (1988) [hereinafter FDA’S 510(K) 
OPERATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED]. 
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administrative and procedural process that was required before a device type 
could be classified. 
Prior to a device’s classification, regulations promulgated following 
enactment of the MDA required that the Commissioner of the FDA refer the 
device to a classification panel consisting of experts in the medical area in 
which the device is to be used.107 The panel is to review the device and make a 
recommendation to the Commissioner as to its appropriateness for 
classification into one of the three regulatory classes.108 However, before a 
panel can submit a recommendation to the Commissioner, it must provide “to 
the maximum extent practicable, an opportunity for interested persons to 
submit data and views on the classification of the device.”109 
Once a panel recommends a classification, the Commissioner must then 
review and publish the recommendation along with the proposed regulations 
classifying the device so that interested parties may again have the opportunity 
to voice their concerns.110 Finally, the Commissioner is to review the 
comments and issue a final regulation that classifies the device.111 
The purpose of these procedural elements in part, is to determine the safety 
of the device being reviewed. While the panels are comprised of experts, the 
step affording interested persons the opportunity to submit data could very well 
provide additional information that could result in a more accurate assessment 
of the device’s safety. The same holds true for the Commissioner’s review and 
publication of the recommendations. The Commissioner’s review serves as an 
additional check to ensure that the panel’s perception of safety is consistent 
with that of the FDA, and similarly, publication and opportunity for public 
comments ensure that the FDA’s safety perception is consistent with that of the 
general public. However, these additional steps calling for public notice and 
comment also increase the amount of time required to fully review a device 
and make a recommendation as to what level of classification is required, 
which in turn extends the amount of time and risk of harm caused by the 
prolonged misapplication of the 510(k) Process. 
B. Industry Pushback 
Medical device manufacturers and the industry more broadly, may have 
also played a significant role in the FDA’s device classification delay. The 
510(k) process is the vehicle most commonly used to regulate the availability 
of medical devices in American markets.112 This is largely due to the fact that 
 
 107. 21 C.F.R. § 860.84(b) (2014). 
 108. 21 C.F.R. § 860.84(c). 
 109. 21 C.F.R. § 860.84(c)(5). 
 110. 21 C.F.R. § 860.84(f). 
 111. 21 C.F.R. § 860.84(g). 
 112. INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at xi. 
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the 510(k) Process is far less burdensome and time consuming than the PMA 
Process. Naturally, device manufacturers would be drawn to the use of an 
easier process whenever possible. The 510(k) Process is not only the swifter 
and less strenuous means to achieve marketing clearance, but its use also 
represents substantial financial savings. 
For Fiscal Year 2015, the standard user fee assessed by the FDA for a 
510(k) application is $5,018, while the standard fee assessed for a PMA is 
$250,895.113 Further, the Advance Medical Technology Association 
(AdvaMed) reports that the actual average cost associated with submitting and 
supporting a PMA is five million dollars and that there are instances where the 
need for clinical trials have pushed these costs well in excess of fifty million 
dollars.114 Faced with the possibility that upon review the FDA will call for 
PMAs for pre-amendment devices and their substantial equivalents, device 
manufactures have been incentivized to oppose and delay the Agency’s review 
and classification of these devices. 
To this end, in recent years, while the device lobby has echoed the empty 
rhetoric calling for the expeditious classification of the remaining pre-
amendment devices,115 just one year before the DePuy hip recall, AdvaMed 
noted that “pre-amendment devices have not presented unreasonable threats to 
the public health in the approximately 30 years they have been entering the 
market, and generally are well understood.”116 Further, even as 510(k) has 
been the subject of growing criticism, AdvaMed has been a staunch and vocal 
supporter of the use of the process and has spoken out against efforts to impose 
limitations on its use, or to expand the definition of Class III devices and the 
domain of the PMA Process.117 Thus, while the industry conveys a verbal 
commitment to pre-amendment device classification, device manufacturers and 
their lobby have taken actions that in actuality have been far less than 
supportive of this effort. 
C. Limited Agency Resources 
Undoubtedly, the resources at the FDA’s disposal have played a role in the 
speed with which the pre-amendment devices have been reviewed and 
reclassified. Issues relating to funding as well as staffing within the Agency 
 
 113. Notice, 79 Fed. Reg. 44178, 44180 (July 30, 2014). 
 114. COMMENTS OF ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, DOCKET NO. FDA-
2013-N-1259, at 3 (April 24, 2014), available at http://advamed.org/res.download/698. 
 115. See COMMENTS OF ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, DOCKET NO. 
FDA-2011-N-0556, at 3 (Sept. 30, 2011), available at http://advamed.org/res.download/184. 
 116. Letter from Stephen J. Ubl. President & CEO, Advanced Medical Tech. Ass’n, to 
Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., at 3 (May 22, 2009), available at http://ad 
vamed.org/res.download/186. 
 117. COMMENTS OF ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, supra note 114, at 1-
2. 
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have been well documented over the past several decades.118 Throughout the 
1980s, the FDA saw an overall decrease in its staff, losing nearly 600 
employees, which accounted for nearly ten percent of its staff.119 As noted, the 
FDA did not issue the first final regulation classifying a pre-amendment device 
until 1984.120 Thus, it is understandable that such a significant reduction in its 
staffing resources, during the same time frame that it began undertaking such a 
critically important project, would likely lead to delays. 
Completing review of all the pre-amendment devices classified as Class III 
devices by the MDA has been a highly involved process. It requires not only 
that the FDA refer each of the 170 device types to a classification panel as 
noted above, but also, that PMA Applications be submitted for all pre-
amendment devices and their substantially equivalent progeny that are 
ultimately determined to be properly classified in Class III.121 A 1988 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report indicated that nearly 2,000 
devices had been cleared through 510(k) notifications claiming substantial 
equivalence to pre-amendment Class III devices.122 If the FDA determined that 
PMA applications were required for each of the pre-amendment predicates 
supporting those 2,000 510(k) notifications, reviewing just those 2,000 devices 
would have taken the FDA eleven years.123 
More recently, budgetary constraints have restricted the number of Agency 
employees dedicated to the FDA’s division responsible for reviewing medical 
devices. Between Fiscal Years 2008 and 2010, the number of full time 
equivalent staff within the Center for Devices and Radiological Health 
(CDRH) was limited to approximately 1,200.124 While this is a marked 
increase from the levels observed in the 1980s and 1990s,125 these employees 
 
 118. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-88-14, FDA RESOURCES: 
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF STAFFING, FACILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT NEEDED 12 (1989) 
[hereinafter FDA RESOURCES]. 
 119. Id. at 12. An actual increase in staffing levels was observed in at least three years during 
the 1980’s; however, the net difference in FDA staffing levels over the course of the decade 
indicate that there was a significant staffing decline. Id. The impact that this decline had on any 
specific FDA center or project was not reported. 
 120. FDA’S 510(K) OPERATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED, supra note 106, at 38. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2010 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST 265 (2009) 
(showing that in Fiscal Year 2008 the FTE for the CRDH was 1130, while the omnibus and 
estimated figures for 2009 and 2010 were 1204 and 1275 respectively). 
 125. See FDA RESOURCES, supra note 118, at 12 (where actual FDA staffing for 1988 totaled 
7,103 FTE); cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-581, FDA FACES CHALLENGES 
MEETING ITS GROWING MEDICAL PRODUCT RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHOULD DEVELOP 
COMPLETE ESTIMATES OF ITS RESOURCE NEEDS (2009) [hereinafter FDA FACES CHALLENGES] 
(reporting that actual FDA staffing for 2008 totaled 9,811 FTE). 
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are expected to handle all the tasks for which the CDRH is responsible. In 
addition to reviewing and reclassifying pre-amendment devices, the CDRH’s 
responsibilities include: limiting and controlling human exposure to medical, 
occupational, and consumer products emitting radiation; monitoring and 
enforcing good manufacturing practice regulations and standards for devices 
and radiation-emitting products; tracking compliance with surveillance 
programs and adverse events related to such devices and products; and 
providing technical assistance to product and device manufacturers.126 Because 
of the 510(k) Process’s relative ease of review, the majority of medical devices 
subject to premarket review seek clearance through that method. Consequently, 
since the FDA is expected to complete 510(k) and PMA review within 
statutorily mandated timeframes, much of the CDRH’s resources must be 
allocated to 510(k) review. 
Additionally, reports indicate that while the FDA and by extension, the 
CDRH, have seen increases in staffing and funding in recent years, these 
increases have not been proportional to the rise in the CDRH’s workload.127 
Thus, with such a multitude of tasks to complete and such limited resources to 
dedicate toward their completion, Class III pre-amendment devices have 
become a staple among the device types reviewed through 510(k). 
D. Progress Made Toward Completion 
While the issues identified thus far rationalize, to some extent, the delay in 
the completion of review of pre-amendment devices, these concerns are not 
new. Reports of issues relating to the procedural complexity and Agency 
resources required to complete pre-amendment device review have been 
documented for decades.128 Even though the practice is still in use nearly forty 
years after Congress—out of necessity—temporarily authorized the use of the 
510(k) Process to evaluate some of the most high-risk medical devices, it is 
important to note that progress, in fact substantial progress, has been made 
towards the end of classifying the remaining pre-amendment devices and 
bringing an end to this 510(k) misuse.129 Much of this progress, however, has 
only come as a result of legislative action forcing changes in the FDA’s 
practices. Though these efforts have primarily been aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of the existing 510(k) and PMA review processes, they have had at 
 
 126. ROSEANN B. TERMINI, LIFE SCIENCE LAW: FEDERAL REGULATION OF DRUGS, 
BIOLOGICS, MEDICAL DEVICES, FOODS AND DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS 63 (2010). 
 127. See generally FDA FACES CHALLENGES, supra note 125. 
 128. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 81; see also FDA’S 510(K) OPERATIONS COULD BE 
IMPROVED, supra note 106, at 38; see also FDA RESOURCES, supra note 118, at 12-19. 
 129. As of February 2014, just fourteen devices remain unclassified. See 515 Project Status 
2014, supra note 101. See also infra note 156. 
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least some incidental or residual impact on the review of pre-amendment 
devices. 
The SMDA of 1990 attempted to ease the burden that pre-amendment 
devices placed on the FDA.130 In order to do this, the SMDA advanced a more 
expansive definition of Class II devices than had previously been included in 
the MDA. This new definition now included some devices that would have 
previously been included in Class III. The SMDA defines a Class II device as: 
A device which cannot be classified as a class I device because the general 
controls by themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the 
safety and effectiveness of the device, and for which there is sufficient 
information to establish special controls to provide such assurance, including 
the promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient 
registries, development and dissemination of guidelines (including guidelines 
for the submission of clinical data in premarket notification submissions in 
accordance with section 360(k) of this title), recommendations, and other 
appropriate actions as the Secretary deems necessary to provide such 
assurance. For a device that is purported or represented to be for a use in 
supporting or sustaining human life, the Secretary shall examine and identify 
the special controls, if any, that are necessary to provide adequate assurance of 
safety and effectiveness and describe how such controls provide such 
assurance.131 
Additionally, the SMDA authorized the FDA to order pre-amendment 
device manufacturers to submit reports containing additional information 
regarding device safety and effectiveness and re-evaluate these unclassified 
devices based on this information. 132 By expanding the definition of Class II 
devices and easing the process for re-evaluating unclassified devices, Congress 
allowed a number of less dangerous pre-amendment devices that would have 
otherwise remained in Class III to be moved into Class II. This reduced the 
need for the FDA to waste time and resources calling for and reviewing PMA 
applications for both pre-amendment devices and their post-amendment 
substantial equivalents, in situations where such review was not actually 
necessary to evaluate the safety of a device. 
The SMDA also ordered the FDA to, “as promptly as is reasonably 
achievable,” establish a schedule for the issuance of regulations requiring PMA 
Applications for all Class III pre-amendment devices that would not be 
reclassified as Class I or Class II devices.133 This schedule was released in 
1994 and divided the remaining devices into three categories based on each 
 
 130. See INST. OF MED., supra note 39, at 228. 
 131. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2012), amended by Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-629, § 5, 104 Stat. 4511, 4517-18 (1990). 
 132. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(i) (2012). 
 133. Safe Medical Devices Act § 4(b)(1). 
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device’s level of use and potential for being down-classified.134 Establishing 
such a schedule should have forced the FDA to become more accountable and 
expedite the completion of the pre-amendment review process. Admittedly, to 
some extent it did, as there were 116 Class III pre-amendment devices subject 
to 510(k) at the time. However, more than a decade later, many dangerous 
devices remain accessible through 510(k).135 
The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA) 
enacted in 2002 authorized the FDA to “assess and collect fees” for various 
premarket review activities.136 Extended in 2007, through the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA)137 and again in 2012 by the 
FDASIA,138 these medical device user fees have shifted some of the financial 
burden of medical device review to the device manufacturers seeking to market 
their new device and have helped reduce the strain on the Agency’s 
resources.139 
However, even with all this coverage and attention, these efforts seeking to 
inspire the expedient completion of the FDA’s review of pre-amendment 
devices have fallen short of actually reaching this goal.140 This suggests that 
while the design of the regulatory process and the resources at the FDA’s 
disposal may have increased the speed of pre-amendment device review, there 
may be additional factors that have contributed and continue to contribute to 
the Agency’s failure to complete its review. 
E. Priority of Pre-Amendment Classification 
The delay in the FDA’s pre-amendment device classification may have 
also, at least in part, been caused by the low level of priority given to these 
devices throughout the MDA-era. 
 
 134. 62 Fed. Reg. 32,356 (June 13, 1997). 
 135. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-190, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA 
SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH 
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As noted, the CDRH is the branch of the FDA responsible for both 
ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices and limiting exposure 
to radiological products.141 Given these broad responsibilities, the duties 
stemming from them certainly extend beyond simply implementing premarket 
review mechanisms for medical devices. However, premarket review 
represents the first, and perhaps most crucial, step in ensuring the safety of 
medical devices marketed in the U.S.142 Even just within premarket review, the 
intricacies of the various kinds of medical devices themselves, and the state of 
the market for such devices when Congress enacted legislation initiating their 
regulation, have complicated the task assigned to the FDA and carried out by 
the CDRH. Given the importance of this first step, it follows that it necessitates 
tremendous FDA focus and attention. 
However, if premarket review is merely the first step in ensuring device 
safety, proper review of medical devices prior to their marketing can be 
summarized in two main sub-steps. First, devices must be appropriately 
classified into one of three statutorily defined risk-based classifications.143 And 
second, once classified, devices must undergo a risk-appropriate review 
assessment (generally 510(k) or PMA), to determine their fitness for public 
use.144 Because Class III devices pose the greatest potential for risk, Congress 
requires that PMA—the most stringent and time consuming review process—
be used to ensure their safety.145 
The crux of these premarketing sub-steps is that before the safety of a 
particular device can be adequately evaluated, the FDA must first determine 
which means are actually appropriate for evaluating its safety. Thus, it can be 
inferred from the basic construction of premarket review that the paramount 
phase of the process is proper classification of a device. It seems to follow 
within this premarket review scheme that the safety of a device improperly 
classified into a lower class (Class I or II) cannot be accurately evaluated if the 
process used to evaluate it cannot sufficiently assess the safety of devices 
falling within the category in which the device ought to have been properly 
classified (Class II or III). However, the importance of classification 
notwithstanding, it appears as though a greater deal of attention is given to 
other Agency functions. The amount of time required to review devices using 
510(k) or PMA, implementing post-market surveillance measures within the 
CDRH, and addressing various non-medical device related Agency functions 
more broadly throughout the FDA seem to take the forefront with respect to 
 
 141. See supra Part V.C. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(1) (2012). 
 144. See 21 U.S.C. §360(k) (2012); see also 21 U.S.C. §360e(a) (2012). 
 145. See Swanson, supra note 105, at 123. 
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the Agency’s focus—all while unclassified pre-amendment devices continue to 
be cleared through the 510(k) process. 
In response to pressure to increase availability of and access to advances in 
medical technology, the MDUFMA and Congress’s authorization and 
subsequent reauthorizations of medical device user fees, sought to expedite 
premarket review of medical devices.146 As a result, greater emphasis has been 
placed on ensuring timely device review. Consequently, the FDA has and 
continues to identify specific performance goals directly aimed at improving 
premarket review times.147 Conversely, however, no similar goals are recorded 
for completion of review and classification of Class III pre-amendments.148 
While there is certainly an interest in promoting the prompt review of new 
medical devices, an equally, if not, more compelling interest rests in ensuring 
that such timely review is appropriate, considering the risks presented by a 
device. 
Though understandably limited, the FDA’s allocation of its available 
resources among the various projects and initiatives for which it is responsible 
also suggests that the Agency has not given the classification of Class III pre-
amendment devices the priority they deserve and require. 
VI.  FDASIA AND COMPLETING PRE-AMENDMENT DEVICE REVIEW 
The latest attempt made by Congress to cure premarket review came with 
the enactment of the FDASIA of 2012. This has arguably been the most 
impactful development with respect to unclassified pre-amendment devices 
since the MDA was initially signed into law. In just the first year-and-a-half 
post-enactment, the FDASIA has paved the way for the completion of review 
and reclassification of nearly as many pre-amendment devices as had been 
reviewed and reclassified in at least the three years immediately preceding 
it.149 
 
 146. Annette M. Zinn et al., Median Approval Times for Class III Medical Devices Have Been 
Well Above Statutory Deadlines Set for FDA and CMS, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2304, 2310 (2012); 
Bauman, supra note 16, at 351-52. 
 147. The FDA has issued performance goals and reports on their completion annually since 
the first authorization of user fees (MDUFA I) was enacted. These reports take into account 
review times, but do not consider progress made with respect to pre-amendment device review 
completion. See MDUFMA Performance Reports, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/UserFeeReports/PerformanceReports/UCM20074 
50.htm (last updated Feb. 14, 2014); see also MDUFMA Annual Reports to Congress, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/MedicalDeviceUserFeeandModerniza 
tionAct/ucm155275.htm (last updated June 27, 2014). 
 148. See MDUFMA Performance Reports, supra note 147. 
 149. The FDA reports that in 2009, twenty-six Class III pre-amendment devices still required 
review. 515 Program Initiative, supra note 14. While it is unclear what, if any, actions were taken 
in years 2009 and 2010, between 2011 and 2012—prior to FDASIA’s enactment—final rules 
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Specifically, the FDASIA modified the pre-amendment classification 
process by amending the administrative procedure originally contemplated in 
the MDA, to eliminate the regulation promulgation requirement.150 Instead, 
FDASIA authorizes the Director of the CDRH and the FDA Commissioner, to 
call for PMA Applications for pre-amendment devices that are determined to 
belong in Class III, by administrative order—after considering comments from 
stakeholders regarding the recommendations made by a device’s appropriate 
classification panel.151 By striking the statutory language requiring the FDA to 
issue regulations calling for PMA Applications, the FDASIA essentially 
simplified the process that the Agency needs to use in order to subject pre-
amendment devices properly classified into Class III to the appropriate 
standard of premarket review so that they could be treated the same as any 
other Class III device. As originally enacted, the MDA required that the review 
and reclassification of pre-amendment devices be completed through 
rulemaking. Consequently, the slow moving notice and comment process 
implicated by this requirement to promulgate regulations became a major 
factor contributing to the delay. However, the use of administrative orders 
offers the FDA greater flexibility in determining whether a pre-amendment 
device should undergo PMA or be reclassified as having only low- or 
moderate-risk, because such orders can be issued without fulfilling the 
procedural requirements necessary for rulemaking.152 
Despite the FDASIA amendments, the MDA does retain a number of 
rulemaking-like procedural requirements that must be fulfilled before a pre-
amendment device can be reclassified or subjected to PMA—namely, 
publication of the proposed order in the Federal Register, a meeting of the 
appropriate device classification panel, and consideration of comments from 
stakeholders regarding the recommendation made by a device’s appropriate 
classification panel.153 Thus, the impact that this change from rulemaking to 
administrative order actually has is likely tempered. However, as demonstrated 
 
providing classification were issued for seven of these devices, which include topical oxygen, 
female condom, pacemaker repair or replacement material, ventricular bypass device, implantable 
pacemaker pulse generator, pacemaker programmers, and cardiovascular permanent pacemaker 
electrode. See 515 Project Status 2014, supra note 101. From January 2013 through February 
2014, final orders classifying devices have been issued for five Class III pre-amendments, which 
include the temporary mandibular condyle reconstruction plate, intra-aortic balloon and control 
system, external counter-pulsating devices, transilluminator for breast evaluation, and the sorbent 
hemoperfusion system. Id. See also infra note 156. 
 150. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (2012), amended by Food and Drug Administration Safety and 
Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 608(b), 126 Stat. 993, 1056-59 (2012). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 316 (3d ed. 2009). 
 153. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b). 
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by the five device types reviewed and/or reclassified in the less than two years 
since the FDASIA became effective, the relaxed procedural requirements have 
contributed to greater efficiency and progress toward the completion of the 
review and reclassification of the remaining Class III pre-amendment 
devices.154 
Empowered by recent changes in the law, the FDA has targeted the end of 
2014 for the completion of the remaining pre-amendment devices.155 Unlike 
the legislative efforts before it, the FDASIA addresses many of the issues that 
have plagued the FDA’s review of pre-amendment devices over the past four 
decades. The extension of the medical device user fees provides for greater 
Agency funding. The switch from rulemaking to administrative orders deals 
with the overly burdensome procedural process. Further, providing the 
Director of the CDRH the authority to actually issue these administrative 
orders localizes control over the process, and allows those most knowledgeable 
to be directly involved in the FDA’s final classification decision-making. In 
addition to helping ease some of the administrative and procedural burdens 
associated with pre-amendment device classification, this could aid in 
prioritizing the classification of these devices within the Agency and bring an 
end to the continued misuse of the 510(k) process. However, the extent to 
which pre-amendment device priority will actually rise is yet to be seen, as 
there has been no Agency oversight or accountability. While identifying a 
target date for completion is certainly a crucial step, little, if anything, binds 
the FDA to meeting this goal or holds the Agency accountable if it does not.156 
 
 154. See 515 Project Status 2014, supra note 101. 
 155. FDA Aims to Complete Device Reclassifications by End of 2014, INSIDE HEALTH POL’Y 
(March 23, 2013) http://insidehealthpolicy.com/fda-aims-complete-device-reclassifications-end-
2014. 
 156. Though it should not come as a surprise, it should be noted that the FDA did in fact fail 
to meet this 2014 completion goal. See 515 Project Status, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda. 
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article’s publication, between February 2014 and March 2015, the Agency completed review of 
three additional device types (the endosseous dental implant (blade-form), implanted blood 
access, and automated external defibrillators); bringing the total number of finalized device 
classifications completed since the FDASIA’s enactment to eight and leaving eleven pre-
amendment device types still to be classified. Id. In a 2014 proposed rule, the FDA sought to 
amend regulations providing the classification procedures that enumerate the specific 
considerations classification panels must take into account when determining what class of 
regulatory control should be recommended for a pre-amendment device. Medical Device 
Classification Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 16,252, 16,257 (proposed Mar. 25, 2015); see also 21 
C.F.R. § 860.84(c) (2014). The proposed rule would have “remove[ed] the requirement to answer 
the classification questionnaire and provide information using the supplemental data sheet.” Id. 
Doing so, the Agency believed, would help result in the more efficient use of Agency resources 
with respect to pre-amendment device classifications. Id. However, the Medical Device 
Classification Procedures Final Rule made no mention of these proposed pre-amendment 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the FDA’s 510(k) medical device PMN Process has come 
under fire due to substantial deficiencies in the regulatory process. These 
deficiencies have raised serious concerns about the Agency’s ability to ensure 
the safety of the medical devices that it clears or approves for marketing and 
distribution throughout the U.S. Numerous reports and device recalls have 
been issued, all highlighting these deficiencies and indicating that there are 
major problems with the medical device premarket review process as it 
currently exists. However, of all the criticism that has been directed toward the 
510(k) Process of late, the most notable and troublesome has been the rampant 
use of this process to evaluate pre-amendment and specifically, implantable 
pre-amendment devices that often pose unique and more substantial risks. This 
unwarranted and prolonged practice has exacerbated 510(k)’s problems 
because the process was never intended to serve as a permanent means of 
reviewing such potentially dangerous devices. Thirty-eight years after 
Congress enacted legislation initially authorizing the FDA to regulate medical 
devices, the proper review and classification of these pre-amendment devices 
has yet to be completed and they continue to be evaluated through substandard 
means. Consequently, unsafe devices may still be in use and receive clearance 
for marketing based on the assumption that they are as safe as the older devices 
to which they are found to be substantially equivalent, even though the older 
devices were never properly evaluated. While the FDA has reviewed many of 
these pre-amendment devices and determined and assigned the appropriate 
level of regulatory control needed to ensure their safety, many patients have 
suffered injuries resulting from the use of such devices.157 
Various factors and circumstances may have contributed to this failure. 
However, nothing can excuse the amount of time that has lapsed, the number 
of devices that have been cleared, and the number of people who have been put 
in danger as a result of 510(k)’s misuse. While recent legislation finally offers 
 
procedure changes. Medical Device Classification Procedures; Reclassification Petition: Content 
and Form; Technical Amendment, 79 Fed. Reg. 77387 (Dec. 24, 2014). The FDA has since 
issued proposed orders offering the Agency’s proposed classifications for nine of the remaining 
eleven pre-amendment device types and is currently reviewing and considering comments 
received for six of them. See 515 Project Status 2015, supra note 156. Thus, while the Agency is 
undoubtedly making an effort to bring the circumstances necessitating 510(k)’s continued misuse 
to an end, even with the FDASIA’s pre-amendment review procedural overhaul, viewed in light 
of these more recent developments, it seems that the FDA’s non-binding 2014 completion target 
may have simply been an over-ambitious estimation given the resources available to the Agency, 
or just more of the same empty rhetoric that has plagued these pre-amendment devices for the last 
forty years. What is clear, however, is that while thirty-eight years may not have been enough 
time to complete review of these pre-amendment devices, the thirty-ninth has not proved to be 
any more promising; and so, we shall continue counting. 
 157. See Zuckerman et al., supra note 11, at 1007. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THIRTY-EIGHT YEARS AND COUNTING 373 
a redeeming opportunity to salvage what has otherwise been nothing short of a 
disastrous attempt at regulating medical devices made available in the U.S., a 
larger issue remains unsolved. 
The shortcoming befalling the implementation of the MDA are not 
necessarily unique to medical devices. Prior to its enactment, Congress, 
struggling to develop a method for addressing the devices that had already 
been on the market, looked for guidance from the handling of similar 
challenges that arose in the wake of the adoption of the Food Additive 
Amendments of 1958, the Color Additive Amendments of 1960, and the Drug 
Amendments of 1962.158 As shown by these earlier amendments, medical 
technology continues to march forward. Advancements continue to be made. 
At some point, technological advancements may again outpace the current 
regulatory framework and challenge traditional definitions, categorizations, 
and classifications of drugs, devices, and other medical products, just as was 
the case when Congress recognized there was a need for more comprehensive 
medical device regulation.159 When that time comes, lessons learned from the 
medical device experience should direct the regulatory approach pursued, so 
that legitimate assurances of safety can be expected. 
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